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Within the EU, it is agreed that watershed-based management of water quality problems is likely 
to be more economically efficient compared to existing institutional arrangements. Watershed 
authorities, assigned under the European Water Framework Directive, do however lack financial 
resources for policy implementation. EU funding for agri-environmental measures is mainly 
channeled through CAP via national governments to the farmers. In this paper, a mechanism for 
allocating international funds to watershed authorities is investigated assuming that there is a risk 
of moral hazard on behalf of the regional authority. The assumed purpose of the funding is to 
reduce nitrogen loads to the Baltic Proper, and the implications of uncertainty about the risk of 
climate change are investigated. Results shows that the risk premium associated with the presence 
of moral hazard can be high if there is a high likelihood of climate change and marginal damage 
is increasing rapidly in loads. 
 
Introduction 
Eutrophication of the Baltic Sea is a major environmental problem in the region. The 
European Marine Strategy Framework Directive should, in principle, guide cooperation 
between Member States as well as non-EU countries on international water management, 
such as needed for the Baltic Sea. However, it is feared that the Directive will be weak in 
this regard, e.g. as the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is excluded from reformation 
with regard to the marine environment (Salomon, 2006). Instead the European Water 
Framework Directive (WFD), which governs surface and coastal water policies, plays an 
important role for the development of the ecological status of the sea. Under the WFD, 
assigned river basin authorities are responsible for water quality. These regional 
watershed bodies have superior knowledge about landscape and other regional 
characteristics compared to the central EU-administration or national governments, 
implying that they can be better suited to identify cost-efficient measures. However, the 
river basin authorities are delegated the responsibility for water quality management but 
not equipped with the resources or the power to enforce policies. Instead, EU funds for 
agri-environmental measures distributed to national governments that, according to 
guidelines for the Rural Development Programs, develop support schemes for farmers, 
implying that there is little cost-efficiency across different polluting sectors.  
 
Interaction between centralized and regional governmental bodies, e.g. the EU 
Commission and the river basin authorities, is characterized by asymmetric information 
and there is a risk that regional authorities act in their own interest rather than in the 
interest of the international or national community. This is shown to hinder 
implementation of nutrient (Eckerberg, 1997) and climate policies (e.g. Collier and 
Löfstedt, 1997). In the presence of asymmetric information, the use of a principal-agent 
model is motivated. Most of the literature on asymmetric information in environmental 
policy analyzes agri-environmental policies assuming adverse selection, implying that the 
principal cannot judge the farmer’s cost of providing environmental quality services (Wu 
and Babcock, 1995; Moxey, White and Ozanne, 1999; Baerenklau, 2002; Peterson and 
Boisvert, 2001, 2004), while fewer papers analyze moral hazard where due to uncertainty 
about the response of ecosystems to farmer activity (e.g. Ozanne at al., 2001; Yano and 
Blandford, 2008; Ozanne and White, 2008).  
 In the case of eutrophication, there are difficulties to verify abatement undertaken at the 
sources due to the large number of emission sources of different kind and the uncertainty 
about the relationship between abatement at the sources and the corresponding effect on 
the recipient. Climate change is likely to worsen coastal ecosystems conditions due to e.g. 
increased release of nutrients from inland sources and increased surface water 
temperature (Rabalais et al., 2009; Diaz and Rosenberg, 2008; Andersen et al., 2006; 
Arheimer et al., 2005). The magnitude of effects is dampened if the climate becomes 
stormier and hence sea water mixing increases (Diaz and Rosenberg, 2008). This impact 
of climate change can be difficult to detect in the near term, because of the natural 
weather-driven variability of the systems, and because of these changes also being 
affected by other economic and human activities (Rabalais et al., 2009).  
  
The purpose of this paper is to analyze a mechanism for allocating international funds for 
nitrogen abatement to a regional decision-maker, assuming that moral hazard is a 
problem and that there is a risk of climate change altering the effect of abatement 
measures. From the international decision-makers point of view, uncertainty about the 
impact of abatement motives a risk-reducing portfolio of measures. To this end, a state-
space formulation of the principal-agent model is used, which builds on Quiggin and 
Chambers (1998). The novelty of the paper is the application of the model in an empirical 
context using data for the Baltic Proper watershed. Compared to applied analysis of 
nutrient policies for the Baltic Sea under the risk of climate change (Gren, 2010), it 
differs through the inclusion of moral hazard. 
 
Model 
In the following a model is developed where it is assumed that there is an international 
decision-maker, the principal, who wants to distribute allocate resources to the Baltic 
Proper watershed in the Baltic Sea catchment area in order to have nitrogen loads reduced 
to the sea. In the watershed, there is a regional decision-maker, an agent, who carries out 
the abatement. The international and the regional decision-maker recognize that due to 
the possibility that climate change may affect water- and air-borne nitrogen transports, 
there is uncertainty about the impact that measures will have on the nitrogen loads to 
coastal water. Because of the weather-driven variations in loads, they are not able to 
observe whether climate change has occurred. Therefore, the principal wants to adopt a 
diversified strategy, that will perform relatively well in both states, given the likelihood 
of the states. It is also assumed that the international decision-maker is not able to 
observe the abatement measures actually implemented in each region, but only final loads 
to coastal waters. This assumption is motivated by the fact that current policies are based 
on measurement of and targets for coastal loads (HELCOM, 2004, 2007a,b). Notably, 
there are no official ex-post quantifications of measures actually implemented in the sea’s 
drainage area on national or international level (Elofsson and Gren, 2004), confirming the 
view that international decision-makers are unable to observe measures undertaken. 
Hence the regional agent can only be compensated based on observed load reductions
1. 
Thus the regional agent has an incentive not to reveal the efforts carried out, implying 
                                                 
1 In reality, to get a reliable estimate of changes in the coastal loads, data for several years have to be 
collected to account for weather-driven variations.  that moral hazard is a potential problem and that a principal-agent framework is 
motivated.  
 
The theoretical model presented here builds on the state-space approach suggested by 
Quiggin and Chambers (1998). It is assumed that the regional agent chooses a vector x of 
nitrogen abatement measures, knowing the associated, state-contingent total reductions of 
nitrogen loads  i z  to coastal waters in different possible states i. There are assumed to be 
two states of nature, one baseline state, B, with current nitrogen transports, supposed to 
be known to both parties from scientific studies, and one state C, where climate change 
has altered nitrogen transports. Transports in each state are assumed to be equally well 
known to the decision-makers, e.g. based on scientific studies. If an abatement vector x is 
applied and state B occurs, then we have a nitrogen load reduction  B z . Alternatively, if x 
is applied and state C occurs, then  C z  occurs. However, neither the agent nor the 
principal knows the state at the time when the abatement vector is decided upon. Moral 
hazard arises because the international decision-maker cannot observe either abatement 
efforts or the state of nature that really appears. However, the principal knows the 
abatement technology and the agent’s utility function and he has the right to decide on 
the terms of the contracts with regard to compensation for load reductions achieved. In 
addition, it is assumed that the principal is risk-neutral and that his preferences depend 
only upon the net benefits of nitrogen reductions. The agent, on the other hand, is risk-
averse, and is free to decide whether to accept or reject the contract offered by the 
principal.  
 
It assumed that costs for coastal load abatement depend on whether climate change 
occurs or not because nitrogen cycles are affected by changes in temperature and 
precipitation. The magnitude of this impact differs between regions and measures, as 
climate change affects temperature and precipitation differently in different parts of the 
Baltic Proper watershed and the impact of climate change on nutrient cycles varies across 
environmental media; air, soils and water.  
 
The regional agent’s ex post preferences are determined by an additive utility function w, 
with 
 
() () wu y g x =−, 
 
where u is an increasing and concave function of the payment y from the principal and g 
is an increasing and convex function of abatement x. Given the assumption about a one-
to-one relationship between the abatement vector x and the corresponding load reductions 
zB and zC, the effort-cost function can be expressed in terms of a nondecreasing and 
convex effort-cost function  () , BC Cz z , which states the minimum cost for reaching 
different combinations of  i z , cf. Quiggin and Chambers (1998). It is here assumed this 
function is strictly convex, strictly increasing and twice differentiable. The agent’s 
maximum expected utility is then defined by: 
 () ( ) ( ) ( ) , BB CC B C E wu y u y Cz z ππ =+− , 
 
where  0 i π >  is the probability of state i. The nature of the pollution abatement problem 
implies that zB and zC, are cost complements in the sense that the marginal cost of 
achieving further reductions in one state is lower if the targeted reduction in the other 
state is already high (see e.g. Laffont and Martimort, 2002). 
 
The principal’s problem is maximize net benefits of abatement through the design of a 
contract that the agent is willing to sign. In the absence of moral hazard, assuming that 





BBB CCC yz Wb z y bz y ππ =− +−        ( 1 )  
 
s . t .             
 
() () ( ) ,0 BB CC B C uy uy Cz z ππ +− ≥ ,         ( 2 )  
 
where b is the constant marginal benefit of nitrogen load reductions and (2) is the 
participation constraint. As abatement is costly, the participation constraint will hold with 










′′ == = ,          ( 3 )  
 
i.e. the agent gets a complete insurance with equal compensation in both states and efforts 
are determined by the ratio of marginal costs and expected marginal benefit in each state. 
However, in the presence of moral hazard and given that the principal cannot observe the 
state of nature, he must instead solve the second-best problem. In this case, he must 
define a payment scheme  ( ) s z , which guarantees that the principal obtains at least his 
reservation utility and which is individually rational to the agent in the sense that: 
 
() ( ) () ( ) ( ) ( ) { } ,a r g m a x , BC B B C C BC zz u s z u s z C zz ππ ∈+ − . 
 
This constraint ensures that it is always advantageous for the agent to choose the 
abatement vector that the international decision-maker wants to implement. The 
international decision-maker’s problem is to design a state-contingent contract structure, 
where the agent receives  B y  if  B zz =  and   C y  if  C zz =  and an arbitrarily large negative 






BBB CCC yz Wb z y bz y ππ =− +−         ( 4 )  
 s.t. 
 
() () ( ) ,0 BB CC B C uy uy Cz z ππ +− ≥         ( 5 )      
 
() () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ,, , BB CC B C BB CB B B B B B uy uy Cz z uy uy Cz z uy Cz z ππ ππ +− ≥+− = −  (6) 
 
() () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ,, , BB CC B C BC CC C C C C C uy uy Cz z uy uy Cz z uy Cz z ππ ππ +− ≥+− = −  (7) 
 
() () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,, BB CC B C BC CB C B uy uy Cz z uy uy Cz z ππ ππ +− ≥+−      (8) 
 
Equation (5) repeats the agent’s voluntary participation constraint and equations (6) ― 
(8) ensure incentive compatibility, i.e. ensure that the agent will always prefer to choose 
his inputs such that ( ) , BC zz is achieved in the two different states in return for the 
compensation ( ) , BC yy. Given that the concave  ( ) u ⋅ and convex  ( ) C ⋅ both appear on 
each side of the IC constraints, one cannot guarantee that the constraints are convex. 
Although a change in variables could solve this with regard to  ( ) u ⋅ , see e.g. Laffont and 
Martimort (2002), a corresponding solution with regard to the two-variable function  ( ) C ⋅  
is not available. Thus, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions associated with this problem will not 
guarantee a globally optimal solution but only a locally optimal one. The problem can 
therefore only be solved numerically using an appropriate solver, which compares the 
outcome at different local optima.  
 
Empirical data 
In the following, the above model is applied to the Baltic Proper catchment, which is the 
largest basin of the Baltic Sea and severely affected by eutrophication
2. The watershed 
includes, partially or wholly, 8 different countries; Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Russia, Poland, Germany, Denmark and Sweden. In this section, calculation of the effort-
cost function is first described, followed by a description of the principal’s benefits of 
nutrient reductions and the agent’s utility of compensation.  
 
 
The effort-cost function 
In order to calculate the effort-cost function, data on the costs of different measures and 
on the impact on coastal load in the two states have been collected. The measures 
included in the calculations are shown in table 1. Data on marginal costs at the sources 
and on baseline nitrogen transport coefficient for measures in all countries surrounding 
the Baltic Proper basin have been obtained from Gren et al. (2008). In each country, there 
are 14 different measures to reduce nitrogen. Eight of those are in the agricultural sector 
and reduce waterborne loads, three are measures to reduce airborne nitrogen oxide 
                                                 
2 I reality, there is no international catchment authority for the Baltic Proper. If the application should fit 
existing institutions, a Water District Authority under the Water Framework Directive could have been a 
better choice for the regional agent. The choice of a Baltic Proper catchment authority as the regional agent 
is determined by available data being disaggregated over measures as well as spatially.  emissions from transport and energy sectors and two are measures directed towards 
waterborne loads from households and sewage treatment plants. Costs are expressed in 
2007 year price level. 
 
Table 1. Abatement measures included in the analysis 
Energy sector:  Agricultural sector: 
Selective catalytic reduction (SCR) on 
power plants 
Reductions in cattle, pigs, and poultry
2 
  Fertilizer reduction 
Transport sector:  Catch crops 
SCR on ships  Energy forestry 
SCR on trucks  Grassland 
  Creation of wetlands 
Wastewater treatment:  Changed spreading time of manure 
Increased cleaning at sewage treatment 
plants 
 
Private sewers   
 
A measure’s impact on the coastal load is assumed to be determined by a constant 
emission coefficient, different for all measures and regions. Data on this impact for state 
B have been obtained from Gren et al. (2008)
3. The impact of measures on coastal load 
under climate change is calculated based on information in the literature. Climate change 
will alter nitrogen transports in several ways. First, changes in temperature and 
precipitation will increase nitrogen leaching from arable land (Arheimer et al., 2005; 
Andersen et al., 2006). Here, the increase in nitrogen leaching is based on the statistically 
estimated relationship between runoff and leaching presented in Andersen et al. (2006), 
where it is concluded that a one percent increase in runoff implies a 0.69 percent increase 
in nitrogen leaching. This is assumed to apply for the whole Baltic Proper region. The 
expected change in runoff due to climate change is calculated for each country as the 
averages over two climate change scenarios in Bergström et al. (2001). A higher leaching 
from arable land is assumed to imply a proportionally higher abatement effect of 
reductions in fertilizer application, manure management measures and land use measures. 
If, for example, leaching from fertilizers is l percent in state B and 2l percent in state C, 
then if fertilizer application is reduced by one unit the reduction in leaching will be twice 
as large in state C. Correspondingly, if catch crop cultivation captures a given percentage 
of the root zone leaching in the baseline state and the root zone leaching is doubled in 
state C, then catch crops would capture twice as much nutrients
4.  
 
Nitrogen retention in wetlands depends on the nitrogen load reaching the wetland under 
consideration (Jansson et al. 1994a; Saunders and Kalff, 2001). Nitrogen retention in 
wetlands will thus increase under climate change due to the higher leaching from arable 
land. The additional wetland nitrogen retention in state C is calculated based on the 
                                                 
3The emission coefficient has been obtained through division of the cost at the sources by the marginal cost 
of reductions in nutrient loads to coastal waters. These data are obtained from the Appendix in Gren (2008).  
4 I.e. the same percentage of the leaching. increase in nitrogen leaching from arable land and the relative loads from agricultural and 
point sources, where the latter is obtained from Gren et al. (2008).  
 
Table 2. Percentage change in the effect of nitrogen abatement measures on coastal load 
in state C compared to state B for the Baltic Proper basin 



















Denmark  7 7 7 3 5  0 
Germany  0 0 0 0 5  0 
Poland  17 17 17 11  5  0 
Sweden  3 3 3 2 5  0 
Estonia  14 14 14 11  5  0 
Latvia 10  10  10  7  5  0 
Lithuania    17 17 17 13  5  0 
Russia 14  14  14  4  5  0 
 
Retention of nitrogen in rivers and lakes will be affected by climate change through 
changes in temperature and precipitation (Jansson et al., 1994b) and changed nutrient 
leaching from arable land (Arheimer et al., 2005, Saunders and Kalff, 2001). Available 
studies suggest, however, that the combined river and lake retention, measured as a 
percentage reduction of nitrogen emitted to inland waters, will remain nearly unaffected 
by climate change (Arheimer et al., 2005; Andersen et al., 2006). Thus, the relative 
impact of coastal and inland sources on coastal load reductions does not depend on the 
state. Also, the impact of measures at sewage treatment and from installation of private 
sewers is unaffected by climate change. 
 
The influence of climate change on transports of airborne nitrogen is limited (Sanderson 
et al., 2006). The deposition on the Baltic Sea may be increased by 0 -10 percent 
(Langner et al., 2005). Here, it is assumed that deposition on the Baltic Proper will 
increase by 5 percent for all countries, implying that the effect of a given reduction in 
airborne emissions will be 5 percent larger in state C.  
 
The differences in the effect of nitrogen abatement measures between the two states are 
included in table 2. Data indicate that the impact of abatement measures on coastal loads 
will be higher if the climate changes, implying that more of the nitrogen load to coastal 
waters could be abated at the same cost.  
 
In order to calculate the effort-cost function  ( ) , BC Cz z , the joint minimum cost of 
simultaneously meeting two randomly chosen nitrogen load targets for each basin, one in 
each state, is repeatedly calculated with the help of a cost-minimization model including 
all measures and countries described above. This way, thirty different pairs of nitrogen 
targets ( ) , BC zz are assigned to the Baltic Proper basin, together with the corresponding 
minimum cost of simultaneously meeting these targets. A smooth quadratic cost function is fitted to these observations using the ordinary least-squares methods. The fitted cost 




12.56 (12.04) ( 6.40) , 0.1527793 0.1466592 0.154139 BC B C B C Cz z z z zz
− =+− , 
 
where nitrogen load reductions are expressed in tons costs in SEK, t-values are included 
within brackets below the estimated coefficients. The negative sign of the last coefficient 
confirms that the two targets are cost complements as described above. 
 
The marginal benefit of nitrogen load reductions 
The willingness to pay for reduced nitrogen loads to the Baltic Sea have been estimated 
in a couple of studies (e.g. Frykblom, 1998; Söderqvist, 1996; Söderqvist and Scharin, 
2000). However, these estimates may not apply directly to the Baltic Proper sub-basin, as 
the use of different sub-basins of the sea, e.g. with regard to recreation and housing in the 
coastal area, varies substantially. Instead, we follow the approach by Mäler (1989), in 
that the principal’s marginal benefit of nitrogen reductions in state B is derived from 
observed policies, assuming that policy-makers equate marginal cost and marginal 
benefit. Using the model in Elofsson (2010), the marginal costs for nitrogen reductions is 
estimated to be 16 EUR/kg N for the Baltic Proper if the nitrogen target of the Baltic Sea 
Action Plan for this basin is met at minimum cost. In the following this is assumed to 
equal the marginal benefit of reductions in both states.  
 
Regional agent’s utility of compensation 
The characteristics of the political system favor risk-averse behavior by politicians, 
although the tendency might be somewhat weaker in federal systems (Rose-
Ackerman,1980). Public sector employees have been shown to be more risk-averse 
compared to private sector employees with regard to their own benefits (Buurman et al., 
2009), but it is not obvious that this carry over to decisions made on within their authority 
as employees. The regional agent is here assumed to be risk-averse with regard to the 
uncertain compensation they achieve. A simple quadratic utility function,  ()
2 uy y y β =−
, is used. This choice of utility function implies that the agent’s degree of absolute risk 











. It is assumed that β=0.001, implying a 
very low level of risk aversion compared to available estimates of individual risk 
aversion, see e.g. Saha (1994). However, public risk aversion can be expected to be lower 
than for individuals due to the larger possibilities to larger actors to diversify risk.  
 
Results 
In the following results from the above model are presented, based on calculations with 
GAMS using the BARON solver. Nitrogen reductions and corresponding compensations 
under the first best and second best contracts are discussed. The risk premium that the 
principal would be willing to pay to avoid the moral hazard problem is calculated. The 
probability of each state is assumed to be common knowledge to the two parties. 
However, results are calculated for a range of different probabilities of nitrogen 
transports being altered due to climate change. This is motivated by uncertainty about this probability, where its magnitude is ultimately determined by both uncertain natural 
processes and uncertain future climate policy (Meinshausen et al., 2009). Finally, the 
sensitivity of results with regard to assumptions about the marginal benefits of reductions 
and the degree of risk aversion is investigated.  
 
The first best contract is determined by costs and expected benefits only. Under the first 
best contract, the smallest expected nitrogen reductions are contracted under equal 
probabilities. Equal probabilities of the two states can be interpreted as a more risky 
situation compared to one with unequal probabilities, given that the variance of the two-
point distribution is maximized when probabilities are identical. With large differences in 
probabilities and cost complementarity between reductions in the two states, the marginal 
cost to increase abatement in the less likely state is low because less abatement is carried 
out in that state. It is therefore inexpensive to undertake additional nitrogen reductions in 
the less likely state, which explains the higher expected reductions. Compensation under 
a first best contract is, essentially, proportional to expected reductions.  
 
Under a second best contract, i.e. when incentive constraints are included, contracted 
reductions lower and a differentiated compensation scheme is necessary to induce a 
diversified strategy by the agent. Compensations are determined not only by marginal 
costs and expected marginal benefit but also by the need to provide the agent with 
incentives for diversification. The highest compensation per unit of nitrogen reduction, 
i.e. the highest yi/zi, is paid in the most likely state, when the likelihood of the two states 
is similar. The highest yi/zi is paid in the climate change and baseline states, respectively, 
when the likelihood of the state is 0.6. This is explained by the combination of high 
marginal costs for increasing abatement in the less likely state and high marginal cost for 
incentivizing the agent.  
 
In spite of the assumption of the regional agent being little risk averse, the principal’s net 
benefits under second best contracts are clearly below those under first best contracts.  
Figure 1 below illustrates the risk premium associated with moral hazard, i.e. the 
difference in net benefits under first and second best contracts. The risk premium is thus 
the amount that the international decision maker would be willing to pay to have the first 
best contract instead of the second best. Its size depends on the distribution of 
probabilities between the states, marginal abatement costs and marginal costs for 
incentivizing the agent. The latter costs are the highest when the gains from cheating are 
the largest, and results show that with initial data those gains are the largest when the 
probability of climate change is 0.7. With this probability, the regional agent makes a 
large gain from cheating because considerable costs are saved by only providing state B 
reduction in state C, while the compensation for providing baseline reductions is still high 
given that the probability of that state is relatively high. The risk premium also depends 
on expected marginal net benefit of abatement, which increases if the probabilities 
become more unequal. This is because the marginal cost of additional abatement in the 
less likely state falls. Intuitively, abatement in the less likely state becomes more of a 
costless side-benefit of abatement in the more likely state. This expected marginal benefit 
of abatement increases more rapidly when the probability of state C increases given that 
it is already larger than 0.5. This is explained by the lower cost for nitrogen reductions in state C. The net effect of abatement and incentivization cost is that the largest risk 





Fig. 1. Sensitivity of risk premium w.r.t. marginal benefit of reductions under change and 
agent risk aversion. 
 
Sensitivity analysis 
In the above calculations, two factors are more uncertain: relative marginal benefits of 
nitrogen reductions in the two states and risk aversion of the regional agent. A change in 
the risk aversion only affects the results quantitatively, and therefore the focus here is on 
the sensitivity of results w.r.t. assumptions about the benefits of load reductions.  
 
Nitrogen loads could be 10-20 percent higher under climate change (Arheimer et al., 
2005; Andersen et al., 2006). If the damage function is convex, this would increase the 
marginal benefit of nutrient reductions. Assuming that climate change implies a 15 
percent increase in loads, and noting that the price elasticity of demand for nitrogen 
reductions is estimated to be approximately -2.0 (Hökby and Söderqvist, 2003), this 
would imply a 30 percent higher marginal benefit in state C. Calculations show that this 
would increases reductions in both states, if the probability of state C is greater than 0.4. 
Nitrogen reductions are higher in state C also when the probability of that state is low, 
but at the expense of lower reductions in state B, as resources are reallocated to provide 
higher reductions in the less likely state C while reductions in state B are expensive. The 
higher marginal benefit in state C increases compensation in both states because of higher 
abatement costs for all probabilities and higher marginal costs for incentivizing the agent 
when the likelihood of state C is high. In figure 1, the sensitivity of the risk premium with 
regard to above changes in parameters is illustrated. With an assumed higher marginal 
benefit of abatement under climate change, the risk premium is increases considerably 
when the likelihood of state C is high, reaching a maximum when the probability of state 





































Initial datacost for incentivizing the agent being smaller as the cost-saving from only providing state 
C reductions in state B are smaller when contracted reductions are more similar. To 
investigate the role of assumptions about agent’s risk aversion, the effect of assuming that 
β=0.0001 is investigated. Results show that the risk premium is generally lower under a 
lower agent risk aversion compared to the outcome with initial assumptions. 
 
Discussion 
Delegation of funds for nitrogen abatement to lower level governmental bodies is 
associated with several difficulties. Resources should, ideally be allocated such that the 
maximum net benefits are achieved. This requires information on costs and benefits of 
abatement in different regions as well as tools to evaluate the role of uncertainty about 
the response of ecosystems to abatement. Earlier research has shown that there is a risk of 
moral hazard on behalf of lower level governments, implying that it can be necessary to 
provide the lower level government with incentives to act in the interest of the larger 
society. In this paper, a scheme is developed which takes moral hazard into account when 
the target is to reduce nitrogen loads to the Baltic Proper, acknowledging that there is 
uncertainty about whether climate change will alter nitrogen transports. The paper shows 
that if lower level governments act in their own interest in the presence of uncertainty of 
the effect of abatement, compensation schemes need to be adjusted to take this into 
account. Even when such adjustment is made, the presence of moral hazard reduces the 
overall benefits to society from policies to lower nitrogen loads to the Baltic Proper. The 
loss depends on the likelihood of climate change, the difference in the benefits of 
nitrogen reductions under climate change compared to current conditions and the degree 
of risk aversion by the regional government. Relating the above scheme to the existing 
institutions for water management, this loss should be compared with the gains of 
delegating abatement decisions to the regional level instead of distributing funds within 
the CAP framework, noting that these gains are determined by the potentially higher skill 
of the regional governments in indentifying low-cost abatement strategies. 
 
It should be recognized that some of the input data used for the calculations in this paper 
are uncertain. First, it is assumed that the likelihood of climate change affecting nitrogen 
transports is known to both parties. The real-world uncertainty about this likelihood is 
here addressed through analyzing the consequences of different assumptions about this 
likelihood, while maintaining the assumption that the likelihood is given and perceived 
equal by the two parties. One way to develop the model in the future would therefore be 
to allow for an uncertain probability of climate change affecting nitrogen transports and 
for differences in risk perception (cf. e.g. Sjöberg, 2000)   
 
Second, it is assumed that actual load reductions to the coast can be confirmed. However, 
it may take a long time before it is possible to adequately judge the average load, given 
the natural fluctuations. This would require either regional governments to be patient in 
waiting for the compensation or preliminary compensations being paid based on limited 
evidence. Yet, one should note that this problem is already present in the existing 
international policy, where international agreements are expressed and countries 
performance is evaluated in terms of coastal loads. The compensation scheme analyzed 
above is hence based on similar premises as the existing policy.   
Third, the results build on the assumption that the degree of risk aversion by the regional 
agent is known. That is hardly the case in reality. Currently, there is limited knowledge 
on the attitude of governments towards risky environmental projects. It is sometimes 
suggested that the degree of risk aversion is reflected in the income distribution (Carlsson 
et al., 2005), but other studies show that it might be not the risk aversion itself which 
varies across countries but rather the perception of risk (Weber and Hsee, 1998) and the 
political system (Rose-Ackerman, 1980).  
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